As we learn from the website of the ECLJ, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is going to hear another complaint that will offer it yet another welcome occasion to use misguided “anti-discrimination” arguments to push its sinister agenda of fabricating a “Right to a Child” for all and everyone, including those who by nature could never have one.
The case at hand is Charron and Merle-Montet v. France (Appl. N° 22612/15), in which two lesbian women, who are sodo-“married” under France’s controversial Loi Taubira, complain about the fact that legislation currently in force does not allow them to become “parents” through medically assisted procreation using the sperm of an anonymous “donor”. They contend that French legislation, which restricts the use of medically assisted procreation to married same-sex couples who are prevented from procreating the infertility of one of the partners, under the condition that the gametes (sperm and egg cells) of the couple itself are used. According to the applicants thes restrictions, which have the purpose of ensuring that the child may grow up with its true biological parents, amount to a “discrimination” with regard to the “respect for their private and family life” on the grounds of their “sexual orientation”. They claim is that their case (two women, who suffer from no medical issue that make them infertile, but who by nature cannot jointly become parents) should be treated the same way as a man/woman couple in which one part is infertile.
The case is very typical for the hypocritical “strategic litigation” to which the ECtHR in recent years has willingly prostituted itself: while the stated purpose is to fight against an alleged “discrimination” (which in the present case is patently absurd, given that we all know that a woman/woman couple is not the same thing as a man/woman couple, irrespective of what France’s sodo-“marriage” legislation may say on the matter), the true purpose is to fabricate a “Right to a Child” for everyone who is willing to pay for it, no matter how this objective is achieved.
This would obviously reduce the child to a tradeable commodity, presumably very much to the delight of frivolous entrepreneurs such as Konstantin Svitnev (see here), Herbert Zech (here), or Petra De Sutter (here). In the same way, such a “Right to a Child” would by necessity require the providing of a regular supply with “donated” gametes, or gestational surrogacy services, all of which would by implication have to be legalized. But the ECtHR routinely avoids dealing with the real implications of its decisions, preferring to reduce everything to wonderfully simplistic, and elastic, rationales such as “protection of privacy” and “anti-discrimination”.
It should also be noticed that the ECtHR makes its more radical decisions often depend on the presumed “acceptability” of the judgment in the country to which it is addressed: this much was openly admitted in a speech that the (then) President of the Court, Dean Spielmann, delivered at the occasion of the opening of the Court’s judicial year in 2015. In other words: when the Court has reasons to believe that a State (or rather, its government) will accept a radically activist judgment, no matter how legally ill-founded it may be, it will issue such a judgment in order to further its “progressive” cause; if, by contrast, the expectation is that the defendant state will not accept a radical judgment, then the Court’s approach will be more circumspect. At the time, Spielmann referred to the Court’s highly controversial judgment in the case of Labassée and Menesson v. France, which in practice opened for Frenchmen the possibility of availing of gestational surrogacy services arbroad and then having their “parenthood” legally recognized in France. The judgment was issued at a time when the French government, presided over by President François Hollande, was itself pushing for the legalization of the abominable practice of surrogacy. No wonder therefore, that the French government did not make great efforts to defend itself against the frivolous litigation and that, once the ill-founded Chamber judgment was issued, it made no request (as it otherwise might have done) to have the case referred to a Grand Chamber. Instead it used the decision propagandistically – “if we are anyway obliged to accept that people travel abroad for surrogacy, why not legalize it domestically”.
This, dear readers, is the sad truth behind much of the ECtHR’s current case law: together with complicit governments, the Court stages a rigged “judicial” procedure to promote causes that very evidently are in contradiction to human rights, human dignity, and basic decency. The newly-elected French President Emmanuel Macron must be expected to be such an accomplice, given that during his campaign he has openly advocated the legalization of gestational surrogacy.